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Current theoretical and empirical research suggests that small banks have a comparative advantage
in processing soft information and delivering relationship lending. The most comprehensive analysis
of this view found using U.S. data that smaller SMEs borrow from smaller banks and smaller banks
have stronger relationships with their borrowers (Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein 2005)
(BMPRS). We employ essentially the same methodology as BMPRS on a unique Japanese data set
and obtained findings that are quite interesting from an international comparison point of view. We
found like BMPRS that larger firms tend to borrow from larger banks. However, unlike BMPRS we
did not find that this was because larger firms are more transparent. Together these results imply that
large banks do not necessarily have a comparative advantage in extending transactions-based lending.
We also found like BMPRS that smaller banks have strong relationships with their borrowers. However,
we find that banking relationships in the U.S. and Japan are strong in somewhat different dimensions.
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There is a general perception in Japan that competition across different types of banks has 
intensified in the past two decades.  It has been reported in the financial press that large banks 
have encroached on the markets that were once the domain of small banks such as Shinkin banks 
and credit cooperatives.
1  Large banks have created and introduced new loan products, such as 
loans collateralized by inventory, non-tangible assets, and accounts receivable, that have been 
specifically targeted to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
2  At the same time the 
number of small banks in market has been contracting due to bank failures and consolidation.
3  
As in other developed economies, these trends raise significant policy questions: Will small banks 
survive in the future in Japan?    If they do not, will some markets become underserved? 
Recent academic research suggests that small banks may have an advantage over large banks 
in providing credit to SMEs.    Specifically, this research suggests that large banks and small banks 
may have different comparative advantages in utilizing different lending technologies.    On the one 
hand, large banks are viewed as having a comparative advantage in underwriting SME loans using 
transactions-based lending technologies that rely on quantitative and transferable information 
referred to as hard information, since they can enjoy scale economies in evaluating such 
information.  On the other hand, small banks are considered to have a comparative advantage in 
                                                   
1 A recent article for example reports that the uncollateralized and non-guaranteed “bargain-sale loans” 
of large bank which aim to capture blue-chip SMEs are threatening regional financial institutions 
(“Ootegin Kousei de Shuueki Kibishiku (Large banks threaten small banks’ profits),” the Nikkei 
Newspaper, January 20, 2004).  Another article reports that in response to this, regional financial 
institutions are increasing uncollateralized loans to SMEs (“Chigin, Shinkin, Mutanpo Yuushi wo 
Kakudai (Regional banks and Shinkin banks are expanding uncollateralized loans),” the Nikkei 
Newspaper, August 2, 2005). 
2 See, for example, “Ginko yu-shi ni kawaridane tanpo: chu-sho torihikisaki kaitaku ni chie (unusual 
collateral for bank loans: beat brains to develop new SME customers),” (Nikkei Newspaper, January 23, 
2006). 
3  Yamori (2005) reports the drastic decrease in the number of two types of cooperative banks in Japan: 
The number of Shinkin banks decreased from 462 in 1980 to 301 in 2005 and that of credit cooperatives 
decreased from 483 in 1980s to 179 in 2005.  
4 
underwriting SME loans utilizing the relationship lending technology, which relies primarily on 
qualitative non-transferable information referred to as soft information.
4  Stein (2002) shows that 
small banks with simple organizational structures have comparative advantages in producing soft 
information and thereby excel at providing relationship lending.  A number of papers have found 
empirical evidence consistent with this theory particularly in the U.S. context (e.g., Cole, Goldberg 
and White 2004, Scott 2004, Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan and Stein 2005). 
The primary aim of this paper is to investigate whether banks have these size-dependent 
advantages in Japan and, more broadly, what this implies for the future of small banks in the 
Japanese context.  Our methodological approach borrows extensively from Berger, Miller, 
Petersen, Rajan, and Stein (2005) (hereafter BMPRS), who found that bank-SME relationships are 
stronger for smaller banks than for larger banks.  Specifically, we apply the BMPRS’s empirical 
methodology to investigate (1) whether smaller firms borrow from smaller banks and (2) whether 
strength of the bank-SME relationship differs by bank size, using a unique data set of Japanese 
SMEs.  We are thus able to examine whether the findings of BMPRS and other U.S.-focused 
studies translate across country borders. 
Our analysis, however, is not just a replication of BMPRS using a data set in Japan.    Our data 
allow us to pursue the issue of bank size and bank-borrower relationships in more depth on one 
important dimension: information verifiability.    Specifically, unlike data used in U.S. studies such 
as BMPRS, our data allow us to identify whether an SME has audited financial statements.    Using 
this information, we decompose the effect of financial statement transparency from that of firm size 
in general.  This decomposition is important, because the availability of audited financial 
statements determines whether an SME can receive loans based on financial statement lending, 
                                                   
4 After the seminal works by Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995), enormous effort 
has been exerted to investigate whether a strong relationship between a bank and an SME brings about 
benefits, such as a lower interest rate and greater credit availability.  See Boot (2000), Ongena and 
Smith (2000), and Elyasiani and Goldberg (2004), for survey.  
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which is one of the most important transactions-based lending technologies.  Our data on 
information verifiability allows us to extend the BMPRS analysis by investigating whether the 
importance of bank size and relationship strength depends on the availability of audited financial 
statements.    That is, unlike BMPRS we can investigate whether bank size and relationship strength 
matter to potential financial statement borrowers and other borrowers. 
By way of preview, we find interesting similarities and differences in SME lending practices in 
Japan compared with those in the U.S.  As for the size correspondence between banks and 
borrowers, we find like BMPRS that larger firms are more likely to borrow from larger banks.  
Unlike BMPRS, however, our methodology allows us to analyze whether this is because large 
banks have comparative advantages in delivering financial statement lending.  We find that they 
do not.  Larger firms borrow from larger banks even when their financial statements are not 
audited.  Thus, other size-related factors are likely to contribute to this size matching between 
banks and borrowers.     
As for the strength of bank-borrower relationships, we find like BMPRS that small banks have 
stronger relationships with their SMEs.    However, our analysis enables us to identify differences in 
small banks’ “relationship building” between the U.S. and Japan.  BMPRS found that the 
bank-firm relationships for small banks in the U.S. tend to i) have a longer duration, ii) reflect a 
shorter distance between borrower and lender, iii) be more personal (more face-to-face interaction), 
and be more exclusive (more likely to be associate with a sole lender).  Our analysis in contrast 
shows that smaller banks in Japan do not have longer-term relationships with their borrowers -- 
although like in the U.S. we also find that smaller banks in Japan have wider business relationships 
with, have a shorter distance to, have more frequent contact with, and have a smaller number of 
co-lenders to, their borrowers than larger banks do.  Thus, our findings on relationship building 
tend to reflect more similarity than difference, although on at least one dimension of relationship  
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building (relationship duration) the countries appear to differ significantly.   
Overall, research findings (ours and the extant literature) on commercial lending in each of 
these two countries seem to fit into the broad framework that predicts a linkage between bank size 
and the deployment of different lending technologies.  Our analysis, however, reveals some 
interesting similarities and differences across the two countries with respect to the nature and 
relevance of specific links, which suggests that SME lending practices may further differ in 
interesting ways across other countries.  Our findings also have some practical implications.  
Specifically, they suggest that small banks in Japan may have a unique qualitative advantage over 
large banks – their ability to deliver soft information based relationship lending – even though in 
aggregate size their lending has been replaced quantitatively by larger banks.     
Our paper makes two main contributions.    First, by conducting a cross-country comparison of 
the largest and the second largest economies, we examine whether SME loan underwriting differs 
across these two countries.  Our findings show some interesting differences, and they seem to 
indicate the possibility that important differences in the financial institutions structures and lending 
infrastructures across countries may affect the way in which banks lend to SMEs as suggested by 
Berger and Udell (2006).     
Second, we offer a significant methodological improvement over other studies of SME credit 
including BMPRS in that we specifically consider the importance of the availability of verifiable 
information in the form of audited financial statements.  As discussed above, this innovation 
permits a more penetrating interpretation of our results and also suggests the avenues for further 
research.  
There are three companion papers that are closely related to this study.  In this paper we 
investigate whether the complexity of banking organizations matter in determining the strength of 
bank-firm relationships.  According to the theory of relationship lending, the strength of the  
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relationship ultimately determines the availability and price of credit, i.e., the benefits of the 
relationship.    Here we do not focus on the benefits of relationship lending.    We address this issue 
using the same data set in a companion paper, Kano, Uchida, Udell, and Watanabe (2006). 
Uchida, Udell, and Yamori (2006a), another companion paper, investigates the use of different 
lending technologies in Japan.  Using a detailed data set obtained from an SME survey in three 
prefectures in Japan, they find that Japanese banks do not use different lending technologies, e.g. 
financial statement lending and relationship lending, as distinctively as banks in other countries as 
Berger and Udell (2006) suggested.    Rather, their findings imply that Japanese banks seem to take 
a synthetic approach in screening borrowers.  That is, irrespective of their size, Japanese banks 
almost always focus on the information contained in borrower’s financial statements, and they also 
put (less) emphasis on the strong relationship with the borrower and the value of borrower’s 
tangible assets that are pledged as collateral.    Our results obtained in this paper are quite consistent 
with these findings. 
Uchida, Udell, and Yamori (2006b) is also closely related to the present study.  Using the 
same data set as that of Uchida, Udell, and Yamori (2006a), they focus on the information 
production/accumulation process by loan officers.    Their analysis is more detailed in the sense that 
they focus on the role of loan officers, but is similar to the second stage of our analysis here.    They 
find results that are consistent with those in the present study, e.g. the irrelevance of relationship 
length. 
The remainder of this paper is composed as follows.  In the next section, we briefly explain 
some institutional background and dynamics of the banking industry in Japan.  In Section 3, we 
introduce the data and methodology.    Section 4 presents the results and their interpretations.    The 
final section concludes the paper with policy implications. 
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2. Institutional background 
The financial services industry in Japan has been segregated since World War II.    Within the 
commercial banking industry, one form of segregation has affected the delivery of large business 
loans and loans to SMEs.    On the one hand, Shinkin banks and credit cooperatives, which are both 
cooperative banks, are mandated by law to confine their commercial lending to SMEs.  On the 
other hand, regional banks and city banks, which are larger and operate under a different set of 
regulations (the Banking Act), have historically focused on larger businesses, although they had not 
been prohibited from conducting business with SMEs.
5   
The primary motivation for this segregation appears to have been to promote expertise from 
specialization and to limit competition in order to guarantee profits and to secure the safety and 
soundness of the financial sector as a whole.  Due to this segregation, practitioners sometimes 
refer to the existence of a “banking ladder” from a firms’ point of view, which begins with a small 
credit cooperative, progresses to a Shinkin bank, then to a second-tier regional bank, to a regional 
bank, and finally reaches one of the largest city banks.  As firms grow, they step up this banking 
ladder and gain in reputation.  Practitioners sometimes use the term “sotsugyo (graduate)” in 
describing when a firm transfers from a lower-ladder bank to an upper-ladder bank.
6 
This once clear segregation appears to be collapsing today, however.    As we mentioned in the 
introduction, there is an abundance of anecdotal evidence that indicates that the customer base of 
different types of banks began to overlap.  In the 1980s, well-performing large and established 
                                                   
5 Until 1989, another type of bank, the Sogo banks (mutual banks), also existed and operated SME 
lending.    In 1989, all but one Sogo banks transformed their types and became banks under the Banking 
Act.  These banks, which are called second-tier regional banks, are included in our analysis in the 
category of regional banks.
 
6 In principle, Shinkin banks and credit cooperatives are allowed to lend to their members only, which 
also contributes for SMEs to sotsugyo.  To become a member of a Shinkin bank, a firm has to have 
employees smaller than 300 persons or has capitalization smaller than 900 million yen.  Credit 
cooperatives have tighter restrictions so that further small firms can only qualify them.  
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firms stopped relying on commercial banks for fund-raising and turned to the capital markets.
7  
Large banks who lost their large business customers turned their focus in response to “blue-chip” 
SMEs and individuals.  As a result, commercial banks (especially large banks) dramatically 
increased their loans to SMEs and individuals during this period (see Hoshi and Kashyap 2001, 
Chapter 8).    There are a lot of recent newspaper articles that report that larger banks have targeted 
and attracted smaller borrowers that used to be the customers of small credit cooperatives or 
Shinkin banks.
8  The introduction of new loan products appears to have been part of this large 
bank strategy of targeting SMEs. 
Despite these reports of large bank entry into the SME market, recent data show that the 
duration of the relationship between SMEs and banks in Japan is still so long that firms rarely 
experience a change in main banks.
9 One possible reconciliation of these seemingly inconsistent 
pieces of evidence is that the role of small banks as the main bank is still irreplaceable and large 
banks have not become primary lenders to SMEs.  Instead, large banks have become secondary 
lenders – or what practitioners call “jun-mein (quasi-main)” or “hi-mein (non-main)” banks.    Thus, 
although large banks have quantitatively increased their SME lending, this does not necessarily 
mean that they have qualitatively superseded small banks and deprived of their role as “true” main 
banks. 
In summary, anecdotal evidence gives us a mixed view about the future of small banks in 
Japan.  To shed some light on these issues, we now turn to our formal empirical analysis of the 
role of small banks. 
 
                                                   
7 Financial liberalization and the development of the capital market also contributed to this flight from 
bank loans.    See Hoshi and Kashyap (2001, chapter 7). 
8  Interviews with bankers from small banks support this view. 
9 As shown below, the average duration is 32.2 years in our data set.  See SME Agency (2002, 2003, 
2004) as well for a long relationship in Japan.  
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3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
The SME data used in this paper comes from the 2002 Survey of the Financial Environment 
(SFE) which was conducted by the SME Agency of the Government of Japan in November 2002.  
It contains detailed information about the SMEs’ qualitative characteristics, their financial 
statements, and their relationships with the main bank.  The main bank is identified by a question 
in the survey which directly asks the firm to identify its main bank.  Since the responding firms 
included large corporations, we confined our sample to SMEs only.
10 
We link the SFE survey data to data on the SMEs’ main banks using two different sources.  
For SMEs whose main banks are city and regional banks, we obtain data on their banks from the 
Nikkei NEEDS Company (Bank) Data File (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc.).    For SMEs whose main 
banks are Shinkin banks we obtain data on their banks from the Financial Statement of Shinkin 
Banks (Kin-yu Tosho Consultant Corporation).  Due to the small number of observations, we 
excluded sample firms for which the main bank is neither a city, regional, nor Shinkin bank.   
 
3.2 Variables and methodology 
3.2.1    Determinants of bank size   
Hypothesis and main variables 
Our methodology here borrows extensively from BMPRS.  In our first set of tests we ask: 
“What size of bank do SMEs choose to borrow from?”    This is an analysis on the determinants of 
bank size.    If, as Stein (2002) predicts, small banks have comparative advantages in producing soft 
                                                   
10  In accordance with the Small and Medium Enterprise Basic Law in Japan, SMEs are defined here as 
enterprises with 300 or fewer regular employees (100 or fewer in Wholesale and Services, 50 or fewer in 
Retail and Food) or a capital stock of 300 million yen or less (100 million yen or less in Wholesale, 50 
million yen or less in Retail, Food and Services).  
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information and large banks have comparative advantages in lending based on hard information, 
opaque firms would borrow from small banks and transparent firms would go to large banks.
11  
We will thus test the following hypothesis: Transparent firms borrow from large banks and opaque 
firms borrow from small banks.   
The dependent variable in our regressions is bank size as measured by the natural logarithm of 
bank assets, log(BTASSET).  The main independent variable is the dummy variable AUDIT, 
which equals one if an SME has audited financial statements.  This variable indicates whether 
there is hard information about the firm’s performance and condition.     
Hard information contained in audited financial statements would make the firm transparent 
and enable the bank to underwrite loans utilizing the financial statement lending technology (Berger 
and Udell 2006).  Thus, our first hypothesis predicts that AUDIT should have a significantly 
positive effect on log(BTASSET).  That is, SMEs that have audited financial statements should 
choose larger banks that have a comparative advantage in providing financial statement lending 
because these loans are based on hard information. 
There is, however, empirical evidence that is inconsistent with this prediction.    Uchida, Udell, 
and Yamori (2006a) report that Japanese banks do not distinctively use different lending 
technologies, and rather take a synthesized approach in screening borrowers by taking into account 
different factors all together.    Judging from this finding, information from auditing may or may not 
be used irrespective of bank size, and thus AUDIT makes no difference in the determination of 
bank size.    Our data set, through the use of AUDIT, allows us to directly test which story is more 
plausible. 
                                                   
11 Subsequent research has suggested that the mapping implicit in Stein (2002) and other theoretical 
work between hard information and large firm lending may be overly simplistic. Some 
transactions-based (i.e., hard information-based) technologies may be well-suited for opaque borrowers 
such as factoring, leasing and small business credit scoring (Berger and Udell 2006).    For a discussion 
of this in the Japanese context see Uchida, Udell and Yamori (2006a).    In our analysis we focus on one 
type of hard information: audited financial statements.  
12 
It is worthwhile noting that BMPRS do not have information on whether the firm’s financial 
statements are audited.  One of their proxies for hard information is firm asset size.  Their 
justification for this proxy is based on a presumption that large firms are more likely to have 
verifiable information than small firms are.    We do not have to rely on this assumption because our 
variable AUDIT directly and precisely captures the availability of the hard information associated 
with financial statement lending.  For comparability with BMPRS and to control for hard 
information which is unrelated to financial statement lending, we include as an independent variable 
log(ASSET), the natural logarithm of the firm’s asset, together with AUDIT. 
In addition to firm size, BMPRS also uses a dummy variable called Records, which represents 
the existence of any sources of financial information, to proxy hard information.    This is, however, 
not a very good proxy for the quality (informativeness) of financial information: it does not contain 
information about whether this information is in the form of financial statements, whether the 
financial statements (if they exist) were constructed by the entrepreneur, whether they were 
constructed based on GAAP, or whether they were constructed by an independent CPA without 
verification (i.e., without audit) – much less whether it was verified by the third party in the form of 
an audit.  Information about the existence of verifiable information with respect to the firm’s 
condition and performance in the form of an audit (represented by AUDIT) is critical.  Without 
this information, BMPRS cannot distinguish between relationship lending and financial statement 
lending.   
 
Control variables 
We also use a variety of different control variables.  From the firm’s financial statements we 
use the current ratio, CURRENT, the capital asset ratio, CAPRATIO, and the pretax profit margin, 
PPMARGIN.    FAGE is the age of the firm; EMPLOYEE is the number of employees; LISTED is  
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a dummy variable which takes a value of one if the firm is listed; and a dummy variable OWNER 
takes a value of one if the entrepreneur of the firm owns more than half shares of the firm.     
We also use PROPERTY, BUILDING, MACHINERY, VEHICLE, TOOL, and LAND, which 
represent the fraction of these tangible assets to total assets.  These variables represent the 
potential to pledge fixed assets as collateral.  Opaque or not, small firms with a high fraction of 
these assets may not have to rely on small banks, since large banks may be able to easily lend based 
on hard information about the values of these assets as collateral.    Within the paradigm of lending 
technologies a la Berger and Udell (2006), banks could use alternative transactions-based lending 
technologies that are associated with these types of assets, i.e., leasing, equipment lending and real 
estate-based lending.  As indicated above, however, Japanese banks that take a synthesized 
approach in screening may not put much emphasis on collateral value (Uchida, Udell, and Yamori 
2006a).  By use of these variables, we can test which hypothesis is more plausible, which is also 
our contribution over BMPRS. 
Entrepreneur characteristics are captured by a dummy variable GENDER, which takes a value 
of one if the entrepreneur is male, a dummy variable HOUSING, which takes a value of one if the 
entrepreneur has his/her own house, a dummy variable EDUCATION, which takes a value of one if 
the entrepreneur graduated from a college, university, or graduate school, and AGE, which 
represents the entrepreneur’s age.  We also use seven industry dummies, CONSTRUCT, 
TRANSPORT, WHOLESALE, RETAIL, REALESTATE, SERVICE, and OTHER, and eight 
regional dummies, HOKKAIDO, KITAKANTO, CHUBU, KANSAI, CHUGOKU, SHIKOKU, 
and KYUSHU.    The default is a manufacturing firm in Tokyo area. 
Finally, three variables are used to control for the market structure of banks.    First, BRANCH 
is the number of branch offices of city, regional, and Shinkin banks in each prefecture.  We also 
use REGBRATIO and SHINBRATIO, which are the ratios of the number of branch offices of  
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regional banks and Shinkin banks, respectively, to BRANCH.  These two variables are to control 
for the difference in size distribution of banks by prefecture.  A larger REGBRATIO implies 
greater access to middle-sized banks, while a larger SHINBRATIO means greater availability of 
small banks.    These variables take the same value for those SMEs in the same prefecture.
12     
 
3.2.2 Strength of bank relationships 
Hypothesis and dependent variables 
We then investigate whether bank size matters in determining the strength of the bank-SME 
relationship.   Following BMPRS, we regress bank size as well as our control variables on proxies 
for strength.  The fundamental hypothesis we test is: smaller banks establish stronger 
relationships with SMEs than large banks do. 
As proxies for the strength of the bank-SME relationships, we take the following five 
alternative variables which are available from the SFE survey: (1) LENGTH, the length of the 
relationship between the firm and its main bank; (2) SCOPE, the variable representing the scope of 
relationships which is constructed by the principal component analysis using the information about 
the existence or non-existence of five particular transactions between the firm and the main bank; 
(3) DISTANCE, a variable representing the physical distance between the firm and the bank 
branch; (4) CONTACT, a variable representing the frequency of contact between the firm and a 
loan officer of the main bank; and (5) NOBK, the number of banks that the firm is borrowing 
from.
13    The data appendix contains detailed description of how we constructed these variables.
14   
                                                   
12  The data of these variables are taken from Fainansu Ja-naru (Finance Journal). 
13 Alternative to NOBK, we also tried a dummy variable, EXCLUSIVE, which takes a value of one if 
the main bank is the sole lender to the firm.  It produced very poor results with few significant 
independent variables, and is thus not reported. 
14  We do not use Trade Credit Paid Late as a dependent variable in our analysis as BMPRS did for two 
reasons.    First, a comparable variable is not available from the survey data.    Second, because our focus 
in this paper is on the determinants of the strength of banking relationships, we do not examine the  
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Using these five variables, we test our second hypothesis in five different ways.  That is, we 
test whether smaller banks are likely to (1) have longer SME relationships (a higher value of 
LENTGH), (2) have relationships with more scope (a higher value of SCOPE), (3) be located closer 
to their SMEs (a smaller value of DISTANCE),  (4) contact their SMEs more frequently (a larger 
value of CONTACT), (5) lend more exclusively (a smaller value of NOBK).    The five regressions 
are run by OLS. 
It is interesting to note that CONTACT is not available in BMPRS.  This variable is 
particularly important because soft information may be obtained through direct contact between 
loan officers and entrepreneurs and frequent contact likely increases the chance of obtaining 
important soft information.    LENGTH and SCOPE also represent the strength of relationships but 
they are more indirect measures compared with CONTACT.    NOBK can also be considered as an 
indirect measure of the relationship strength.  As explained above, however, the main bank is 
rarely changed in spite of the drastic changes in loan shares to SMEs by bank type.  It may 
therefore be the case that only the main bank matters in relationship building.  If that is the case, 
NOBK is a poor proxy.     
Finally, our ability to use CONTACT makes DISTANCE less important, because frequent 
visits from afar would imply a strong relationship, while infrequent visits from a nearby bank would 
imply a weak relationship.    However, these two variables may move in tandem.    For purposes of 
comparison with BMPRS, we use DISTANCE as well.     
 
Main independent variables 
The main independent variable in this analysis is bank size.  As before, we take a natural 
logarithm of the variable and use log(BTASSET).  A finding of a negative coefficient on 
                                                                                                                                                            
benefits of strong relationships, which is the focus of a companion paper (Kano, Uchida, Udell, and 
Watanabe 2006).  
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log(BTASSET) in the LENGTH, SCOPE, or CONTACT regressions, or a positive coefficient in the 
DISTANCE or NOBK regressions would be consistent with the theoretical argument that small 
banks have an advantage in relationship lending.     
In addition, we use AUDIT as an independent variable.    As noted above this variable is used 
to isolate firms that may not have to rely on strong relationships with banks, i.e., financial statement 
borrowers.    That is, if banks use alternatives to the relationship lending technology that do not rely 
on soft information, one of the most important would likely be financial statement lending.  T h i s  
suggests that relationships would be stronger for borrowers other than financial statement borrowers, 
which implies a negative coefficient on AUDIT.     
 
IV estimation and control variables 
In addition to the estimation by OLS, following BMPRS, we also estimate the five strength 
regressions using instrumental variables (IV).  As BMPRS indicate, there may be variables which 
affect both the strength variables (the dependent variables) and bank size (the main independent 
variable).  To control for such effects, we estimate the strength regressions with the bank-size 
determination regression (Section 3.2.1) taken as its first stage.     
Among the first-stage independent variables, we consider REGBRATIO and SHINBRATIO as 
instruments, i.e. REGBRATIO and SHINRATIO do not appear in the right-hand side of the 
strength (the second stage) regressions.  This is because these variables represent differences in 
geographical distribution of branch offices of banks of different sizes.  They should influence 
BTASSET, but would not seem to directly affect the strength variables.  The other independent 
variables of the first stage regression are used as controls in the second stage. 
 
3.3  Summary  statistics  
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Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1.  Firms in our sample are on average 59.1 years 
old, have assets of 2,696 million yen, and employ 75 people.  An average firm is therefore a 
medium-sized firm.    For comparison, BMPRS report that in their U.S. data set, an average firm is 
14.8 years old, and has assets of 3.003 million dollars (368 million yen).  This implies that our 
sample firms are much older and almost seven times larger in size than those in BMPRS.     
Another size difference between our data set and that of BMPRS can be found with respect to 
bank size.  In our data set of Japan, the smallest bank has assets of 42.8 billion yen, and the 
average asset size of all the banks is 19.6 trillion yen.  These numbers are much larger than those 
of the U.S. banks in the data set of BMPRS.    The mean asset size of their smallest quintile banks is 
0.163 billion dollars (20.0 billion yen), and that of the whole sample is 8.883 billion (1.1 trillion 
yen).   
Turning to the relationship strength variables, an average relationship between a sample firm 
and its main bank is 32.2 years.    This is far longer than that in the U.S.    U.S. firms in the data set 
of BMPRS have on average relationship of 8.7 years with their banks.  The average firm in our 
data set borrows from 3 banks, is located 6 kilometers (about 3.75 miles) from its main bank’s 
branch office, and meets with its main bank’s contact person every 46 days.    In the BMPRS’s U.S. 
data set, an average firm is located 26.05 miles (42 kilometers) from its bank branch.  This large 
difference likely reflects the geographic difference between the two countries.    This should be kept 
in mind when we compare the results of DISTANCE across countries. 
Table 2 presents means of some important variables by subsamples decomposed by bank size.   
We can first note that the larger the bank size, the larger the firm size.    This is consistent with what 
BMPRS report for the U.S. SMEs in their Table 1.     
We can also observe several interesting characteristics of the strength of the bank-firm 
relationship in Japan.    First, as bank size increases, the length of the relationship between the firm  
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and the bank becomes longer.    This is exactly the opposite to what BMPRS report for U.S. SMEs 
(their Table 1).  Existing studies would interpret this as a stronger bank-firm relationship for a 
larger firm.  However, Kano, Uchida, Udell, and Watanabe (2006) find that a longer relationship 
may not necessarily be beneficial in Japan.    Table 2 also shows no systematic relationship between 
the level of SCOPE and bank size, which is also inconsistent with the implication of existing studies 
but is consistent with the finding in Kano, Uchida, Udell, and Watanabe (2006). 
Second, the number of lending banks increases as the firm’s main bank becomes larger.    This 
seems to be consistent with the implication of existing theory.    BMPRS report that in the U.S. the 
larger the bank size, the less likely the bank is an exclusive lender.  This may imply that both in 
Japan and in the U.S. firms try to increase the number of lending banks to avoid the hold-up 
problem which they would otherwise suffer from a large single lender. 
Third, as the lending bank becomes larger, the bank tends to be located farther from and tends 
to have less frequent contact with its borrowers.   These statistics may imply that large banks have 
weaker relationships with their borrowers than small banks, as existing theory predicts.  Similar 
pattern (only with respect to distance) is also observed in BMPRS.     
Finally, we see no systematic relationship between bank size and AUDIT.    That is, likelihood 
of having audited financial statements does not appear to be associated with bank size.  This may 
imply that the financial statement transparency does not matter in the choice of bank size. 
In summary, consistent with existing theories and BMPRS, we have observed (1) a 
correspondence between an SME’s size and the size of its main bank, and (2) a negative 
relationship between bank size and relationship strength in terms of NOBK, DISTANCE, and 
CONTACT.  On the other hand, we have also observed (3) a discrepancy between the prediction 
of existing theories and our summary statistics when we focus on LENGTH and SCOPE.  
However, the observations thus far are based solely on univariate analysis.  We thus move on to  
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the regression analysis in the next section. 
 
4. Regression results 
4.1    Determinants of Bank Size 
The results for the bank size determination regression are shown in Table 3.  With respect to 
the key dependent variable, AUDIT is not significantly different from zero.  This insignificance 
indicates that having audited financial statements does not matter in determining the size of a bank 
from which a firm borrows.  This implies that banks do not have any size-related comparative 
advantages or disadvantages in extending financial statement lending.  This finding is important 
because it refutes the conventional prediction that large banks are better at financial statement 
lending.   
We do not know, however, the mechanism working behind this size-irrelevance.  It may be 
because there are no scale economies associated with extending financial statement lending.  The 
findings in Uchida, Udell, and Yamori (2006a), however, imply that the finding just reflects 
non-specialization of banks in distinct lending technologies in Japan depending on their size or 
type.  
In spite of the irrelevance of AUDIT, we obtain a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient for log(ASSET).  Even after controlling for financial statement transparency, larger 
firms are more likely to borrow from larger banks.    The result is consistent with that of BMPRS in 
the U.S. context.    However, the interpretation is different, since we have AUDIT as an independent 
variable which BMPRS did not have.    Even after controlling for transparency in terms of auditing, 
we find an independent size effect.     
This may reflect size-related firm transparency (transparency from sources other than auditing).   
However, it also seems likely to be driven by many factors that are unrelated to firm transparency  
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such as legal lending limit/portfolio diversification considerations and large firm product 
considerations.  Because BMPRS cannot disentangle the firm size effect from the 
transparency/audit effect, they could not draw this inference.  We can also observe in Table 3 that 
listed firms are also more likely to borrow from large banks.  This could also be interpreted as an 
indication that more transparency is associated with firms who borrow from larger banks, although 
this may be capturing some nontransparency-driven factors related to listing. 
Finally, firms with a higher proportion of fixed assets (MACHINERY, VEHICLE and LAND) 
tend to choose smaller banks.  The results on these fixed asset coefficients are slightly surprising.  
Some research has argued that fixed asset lending (e.g., real-estate based lending and equipment 
based lending) should be viewed as separate lending technologies when these loans are primarily 
underwritten based on the appraised value of the assets (Berger and Udell 2006).    Given that these 
are transactions-based lending technologies, we would have expected them to be more frequently 
associated with larger banks a la Stein (2002).     
However, it is difficult to draw strong conclusions here because these assets might not be used 
in the underwriting process or they were used only as a secondary source of repayment (back-up 
collateral) in a loan that was primarily underwritten using the relationship lending technology.    To 
support this view, Uchida, Udell, and Yamori (2006a) demonstrate that pledging collateral is of 




4.2  Strength  of  bank  relationships 
The results on the strength of the bank-SME relationship are shown in Table 4 through Table 8.   
These tables reflect regressions with differing dependent variables used as a proxy for the 
                                                   
15  See Ono and Uesugi (2006) as well.  
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relationship strength.     
 
LENGTH regression 
Table 4 shows the regression with the length of the bank-borrower relationship, LENGTH, as 
the dependent variable.  Both in the OLS and in the IV regressions, we can see that LENGTH is 
not associated with bank asset size (BTASSET), or AUDIT.  This result on bank asset size is 
strikingly different from that in BMPRS and can be interpreted as inconsistent with theoretical 
predictions and empirical evidence that smaller banks have a comparative advantage in processing 
soft information and delivering relationship lending (e.g., Stein 2002, Carter, McNulty and 
Verbrugge 2004, Scott 2004, Liberti and Mian 2006).     
Taking into account some existing evidence in Japan, however, this interpretation may not be 
appropriate.  This result might just reflect some idiosyncratic differences between Japan and the 
U.S. that may dilute LENGTH as a proxy for relationship strength in the Japanese context.  As 
shown in Section 3.3, banking relationships in Japan for example appear to be dramatically longer 
than in the U.S. and, as we have noted in Table 2, LENGTH seems to increase with bank size if we 
focus on their simple correlation.    This suggests the possibility that frictions or other factors in the 
Japanese context might discourage switching banks that are unrelated to the production of soft 
information.
16  Thus, LENGTH may not simply be a good proxy for the strength of the banking 
relationship in Japan.
17.    
 
SCOPE regression 
Table 5 shows the regression with the scope of the bank-borrower relationship, SCOPE, as the 
                                                   
16 These differences or frictions could fall under the broad rubric of differences in the social 
environment.    For a brief summary of the literature in this area see Berger and Udell (2006). 
17  Uchida, Udell, and Yamori (2006b) also obtain evidence that supports this view.  
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dependent variable.  In contrast to the case of the LENGTH regression, both the OLS and the IV 
results show that bank size is negatively associated with the strength of the banking relationship in 
terms of its scope.  Smaller banks have a wider scope of relationships with their borrowers.  
Although we cannot compare this result across countries since BMPRS do not have a corresponding 
dependent variable, the results are consistent with predictions from existing theories.     
In the IV regression, we also find that AUDIT is significant in determining SCOPE.  This 
result might imply that financial statement transparency contributes to strengthening bank-firm 
relationships.  However, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test reveals that log(BTASSET) is not 
endogenous in this specification.    Also, the IV estimation may not be reliable, since the Hansen’s J 
test (the bottom of the table) implies that the instruments are not exogenous (only in this regression). 
Given the inconsistency of this result with our other findings that consistently and robustly show the 
insignificance of AUDIT, it may not be appropriate to place much weight on this finding.   
 
DISTANCE and CONTACT regressions 
When distance is used as our measure of strength we find evidence that bank size matters.    It 
matters in a way that is consistent with BMPRS and theoretical and empirical findings that small 
banks have a comparative advantage in relationship lending.    Specifically, the OLS results in Table 
6 show that a smaller bank tends to be located closer to its SMEs (the coefficient of log(BTASSET)).   
As in the other regressions, however, AUDIT has no impact on DISTANCE. 
The coefficient of log(BTASSET) is insignificant in the IV estimation.  This is in contrast 
with the results in BMPRS in which IV estimations consistently produced stronger significance 
(with the same signs) for bank size than the OLS did in all the strength regressions.    Here, however, 
the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test result indicates that log(BTASSET) is not endogenous and the OLS 
estimates are consistent.    Therefore we focus on the OLS results.  
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Table 7 reports the results of our regression that uses frequency of contact as our measure of 
strength.    The results show that a smaller bank has more frequent contact with its borrowers, which 
is consistent with the U.S. result.
18  Arguably the frequency of contact is the better proxy for 
relationship strength than distance to the extent that the production of soft information comes from 
personal interaction with the borrower.  However, both the DISTANCE results and CONTACT 
results are consistent with each other.  Small banks try to establish stronger relationships with 
nearby borrowers by having frequent contact.     
We should note here that DISTANCE and CONTACT do not depend on firms’ transparency in 
terms of audited financial statements.  Whether a firm has its financial statements audited or not 
makes its relationship with the main bank neither stronger nor weaker in terms of location and 
frequency of contact.    This implies that at least in Japan, having audited financial statements does 
not discourage the use of relationship lending, so that financial statement lending and relationship 




Finally, in our last regression we use the number of banks (NOBK) as our measure of strength.   
In this regression (Table 8), log(BTASSET) is significant while AUDIT is insignificant.
19  Turning 
first to the log(BTASSET) variable, the positive and significant coefficient is consistent with the 
findings in BMPRS and, again, more generally supports theoretical and empirical work that 
indicates that small banks should have stronger relationships with their borrowers given their ability 
                                                   
18 As in the case of DISTANCE, although log(BTASSET) is insignificant in the IV result, the 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test reveals that the variable is not likely to be endogenous, so that the OLS results 
are reliable. 
19 Again, the IV estimation produced insignificant coefficient, but the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
indicates that log(BTASSET) is not endogenous.  
24 
to process soft information.  However, we can go further by investigating whether this result is 
independent of the firms’ transparency.  Here the coefficient on AUDIT indicates that it is 
independent because having audited financial statements does not affect the number of banks used 
by  borrowers.   
  
4.3  Discussion 
Recent theoretical and empirical work has drawn some clear distinctions between relationship 
lending and transactions-based lending.  A key distinction in the literature focuses on the 
comparative advantages and disadvantages of large and small banks.  On balance this literature 
argues that larger banks because of their scale have an advantage in delivering transactions-based 
lending to SMEs because this type of lending involves processing hard information.  This 
literature also argues that small banks have an advantage in processing soft information because soft 
information depreciates as it is passed through the hierarchical structure of large banks.     
In the only comprehensive test of the link between bank size and SME banking relationships, 
BMPRS found evidence that seems to be consistent with this view in the U.S. context.  
Specifically, they found evidence that (1) larger firms, which they consider to be relatively more 
transparent, are more likely to borrow from larger banks and (2) smaller banks are more likely to 
have stronger relationships with their borrowers.    Moreover, their findings on the latter issue were 
quite robust to different specifications.  BMPRS interpret the former result as evidence that more 
transparent firms migrate to larger banks, which have comparative advantages in transactions-based 
lending, while they interpret the latter result as evidence that small banks have comparative 
advantages in extending relationship lending. 
We address these same issues in our analysis using a unique Japanese data set.    We make two 
important points.  First, we demonstrate that the size correspondence between banks and SMEs  
25 
may not imply large banks having comparative advantages in extending transactions-based lending.   
Second, we demonstrate that small banks tend to have stronger relationships with their borrowers, 
but the nature of relationship building is likely to be somewhat different in Japan and in the U.S. 
As for the first point, we find, as BMPRS, that larger firms were more likely to borrow from 
larger banks.  However, our interpretation is different since we have other key independent 
variables that can distinguish between two forms of transactions-based lending.  We have a 
dummy variable for whether the SME has audited financial statements, which makes the SME both 
more transparent and enables it to obtain financial statement lending.    We also have variables that 
measure the firms’ ability to pledge tangible assets as collateral, which should facilitate another 
form of transactions-based lending: fixed-asset lending.     
Our results indicate that these variables do not have an effect on the borrower’s choice of bank 
size – inconsistent with predictions from the theoretical literature.  Therefore, it is not likely that 
larger firms borrow from larger banks because their banks are better at extending transactions-based 
lending.
20  Rather, it may be that bank size matters for other reasons, e.g. bank portfolio 
diversification (small banks avoid large commercial loans because they lead to undiversified loan 
portfolios) or a legal lending limit considerations.
21   
Our analysis thus makes an important point that the BMPRS size-match result may not 
necessarily imply that transparent firms tend to borrow from large banks.  Nevertheless, their 
interpretation (that it does) is still consistent with their results.  That is, it may be the case that in 
the U.S., firm size does reflect firm transparency, and that large banks use their comparative 
advantage in transactions-based lending to finance these firms.    Under this latter interpretation, we 
                                                   
20 Evidence that is supportive of this interpretation is that Japanese banks may not use lending 
technologies as distinctively as banks in the U.S. in a manner Berger and Udell (2006) described (Uchida, 
Udell, and Yamori (2006a)).  Insignificant impact of auditing on the strength of bank-borrower 
relationships, a finding from our analysis of the second stage, also supports this interpretation. 
21  See footnote 6 as well.  
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would conclude that the observed differences between Japan and the U.S. may be the consequence 
of differences in financial institutions structure and lending infrastructure between the two countries.   
However, without information on audited financial statements BMPRS cannot distinguish between 
these two interpretations, i.e., they cannot distinguish whether the large firms’ preference for large 
banks stems from transparency (the demand side) or other factors (the supply side).    Our analysis, 
however, enables us to make such a distinction. 
The second point that our analysis makes is a confirmation of the finding in other studies that 
small banks have a comparative advantage in extending relationship lending.    However, our results 
suggest that the nature of relationship building may differ across countries.    Although the length of 
the bank-borrower relationship has generally been considered the most powerful proxy for 
relationship strength, it does not seem to offer such a proxy in Japan where the duration of 
relationships is quite long for all types of banks.    On the other hand, our results for other proxies of 
relationship strength work in a manner consistent with the results found elsewhere.  That is, our 
results indicate that small banks tend to have stronger relationships with their borrowers in terms of 
the scope of relationship, the distance from the borrower, the frequency of contact, and the 
exclusivity of lenders.  Our results, together with results from other studies, imply that the small 
banks’ advantage in extending relationship lending is likely to be universal, although the nature of 
relationship building may differ across countries. 
On balance, the findings in this paper and in BMPRS on SME lending in the two largest 
economies in the world suggest that lending patterns in both countries seem to fit into the broad 
framework found in the literature that predicts a linkage between bank size and the deployment of 
different lending technologies.  However, in addition to similarities in SME lending in Japan and 
the U.S., our results also revealed some interesting differences with respect to specific linkages.    In 
general our results suggest that in Japan as well as in the U.S. small banks have a comparative  
27 
advantage in relationship lending (although the mode of relationship building may be somewhat 
different).   However, our results suggest the possibility that large banks do not have an advantage 
in deploying transactions-based lending to transparent borrowers.    Whether this is an idiosyncratic 
feature of Japanese SME lending, or whether this result is universal, is beyond the scope of our 
analysis.  However, data limitations in the extant literature on the U.S. and elsewhere (e.g., 
BMPRS) do not rule out the possibility that this result is universal.   
The determinants of these observed and potential differences across countries likely stem from 
differences in the financial institutions structures and lending infrastructures across countries which 
in turn affect the relative efficacies of different lending technologies.  Thus, the relative 
deployment of different lending technologies across Japan and the U.S., and the nature of the 
lending technologies themselves, may be quite different, as suggested by Berger and Udell (2006) 
and Uchida, Udell, and Yamori (2006a). 
The social environment could also be substantially different in Japan and the U.S.
22  I n  
particular, if the level of social capital and trust is higher in Japan than in the U.S., this may affect 
the writing and enforcement of financial contracts.    The importance of social capital in explaining 
regional or cross-country differences in financial contracting has been demonstrated in related 
contexts (Stulz and Williamson 2003, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2004).  Geographic 
conditions could also make it less costly in Japan to conduct relationship lending, which in turn 
would lead to less emphasis on relationship length.  This is clearly speculation on our part, 
however.    More research on this topic, both in Japan and in other countries, is certainly needed. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
                                                   
22 Berger and Udell (2006) consider the social environment to be part of the overall lending 
infrastructure.  
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In this paper we investigated the link between bank size and banking relationships in the 
Japanese SME commercial loan market.  Our methodological approach is very similar to Berger, 
Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and Stein (2005) (BMPRS).  This allows us to shed light on potential 
similarities and differences between commercial lending practices in the two largest commercial 
markets in the world.    Our unique Japanese data set also allowed us to investigate some issues that 
BMPRS were unable to address because of limitations in their data. 
Our results reveal both similarities and differences in SME lending practice across the two 
countries.  We found like BMPRS that larger firms tend to borrow from larger banks, but unlike 
BMPRS for the U.S., we do not find that it is because larger firms are more transparent.  This 
implies that large banks do not necessarily have a comparative advantage in extending 
transactions-based lending, at least in Japan.    We also found like BMPRS that smaller banks have 
stronger relationships with their borrowers.  But there were some interesting differences in the 
nature of relationship building across these two countries.  Our findings of both similarities and 
differences in SME lending between the U.S. and Japan clarifies the nature of the linkages between 
size and lending technologies in these two countries, and suggests the need for further studies in 
other countries. 
Our results also suggest some policy implications.    The blurring wall between different types 
of banks now facilitates inter-type competition among Japanese banks in a manner that seems to be 
unfavorable to small banks.  The results obtained in this paper imply, however, that small banks 
have a comparative advantage in relationship lending and in establishing strong relationships with 
their borrowers.  We also found an association between bank size and firm size although this 
association is not likely due to the transparency of large firms, but rather other factors that may 
drive customer differentiation between large banks and small banks.    These suggest that it may be 
important that the small bank sector of the industry survive in the future.        
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However, we cannot conclude that the future is necessarily bright for small banks in Japan.  
Large banks in Japan have been increasing their lending to small firms.  This may imply that 
although the comparative advantage of small banks in providing relationship lending to small 
borrowers may not change, large banks may nevertheless displace small banks quantitatively.  
Further research is clearly needed to identify the trade-offs associated with this potential shift. 
 
 




This variable represents how many years the firm and its main bank have transactional 
relationships.  The relevant question in the SFE survey considers the existence of not lending 
relationship only but broader relationships.   
2. SCOPE   
This variable is the first principal component of the principal component analysis over five 
dummy variables representing the existence or non-existence of a particular transaction between the 
firm and the main bank.    The five dummy variables are created based on the following five questions: 
(i) whether the SME has a checking account at the main bank, (ii) whether the SME settles notes 
payables at the main bank, (iii) whether the SME has recently purchased stock in its main bank, (iv) 
whether the SME has obtained some information services from the main bank, and (v) whether the SME 
has time deposits at the main bank.     
3. DISTANCE 
Since the original question in the SFE survey only gives us multi-nominal information, we 
constructed DISTANCE as follows: It takes a value of 0.25 if the firm answered that the distance is no  
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greater than 500m, 0.75 if the distance is greater than 500m and no greater than 1km, 5.5 if it is greater 
than 1km and no greater than 10km, 20 if it is greater than 10km and no greater than 30km, 40 if it is 
greater than 30km and no greater than 50km, and 75 if it is greater than 50km. 
4. CONTACT 
The original question in the SFE survey only asks firms to choose from nine categorical options. 
We thus constructed CONTACT as follows: It takes a value of 365 if the frequency of contact between 
the firm and the loan officer of the main bank is answered once a day, 52 if the frequency is once a week, 
26 if it is once in two weeks, 12 if it is once a month, 6 if it is once in two months, 4 if it is once in three 
months, 2 if it is once in a half year, 1 if it is once a year, and 0 if no contact has been made in the past 
one year. 
5. NOBK 
NOBK is the number of lender institutions including non-banks that a respondent firm borrows 
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LENGTH䇭(year) 28.459 283 32.059 759 32.644 340 33.351 481
SCOPE -0.042 283 0.106 759 0.008 340 -0.130 481
NOBK 2.007 283 2.747 759 3.053 340 4.160 481
DISTANCE (kilometer) 4.880 274 5.666 733 5.294 317 7.942 470
CONTACT (days/year) 60.477 277 50.056 738 45.485 324 33.331 474
BTASSET (million yen) 491,945 283 2,780,385 759 5,970,119 340 66,900,000 481
ASSET (thousand yen) 1,259,390 283 2,328,040 759 2,689,793 340 4,127,756 481
FAGE (year) 40.290 283 45.382 759 50.103 340 51.127 481
EMPLOYEE (person) 33.498 283 57.312 759 69.391 340 131.869 481
LISTED 0.000 283 0.001 759 0.009 340 0.062 481
OWNER 0.587 283 0.491 759 0.459 340 0.295 481
GENDER 0.975 283 0.975 759 0.991 340 0.992 481
HOUSING 0.922 283 0.900 759 0.876 340 0.875 481
EDUCATION 0.417 283 0.559 759 0.629 340 0.788 481
AGE (year) 57.982 283 58.895 759 59.059 340 60.150 481
AUDIT 0.534 283 0.581 759 0.615 340 0.580 481
5-10 trillion yen 1 - 5 trillion yen
Table 2:  Mean of important variables by bank size





Intercept Intercept 15.6011 *** 1.3002 0.000
AUDIT 0.1001 0.0614 0.103
log(ASSET) 0.1288 *** 0.0257 0.000
BRANCH 0.0004 * 0.0002 0.083
REGBRATIO -3.1309 ** 1.4026 0.026
SHINBRATIO -1.0949 1.4180 0.440
CURRENT -0.0008 0.0016 0.639
CAPRATIO 0.3475 *** 0.1252 0.006
PPMARGIN 0.0742 0.3868 0.848
BUILDING -0.2441 0.2650 0.357
MACHINERY -0.7149 ** 0.3249 0.028
VEHICLE -1.7938 * 1.0870 0.099
TOOL -1.5940 1.3283 0.230
LAND -0.7270 *** 0.2572 0.005
FAGE 0.0006 0.0022 0.784
FAGE2 0.0000 0.0000 0.398
EMPLOYEE 0.0003 0.0002 0.145
LISTED 0.5046 ** 0.1950 0.010
OWNER -0.2187 *** 0.0654 0.001
GENDER 0.2630 0.2277 0.248
HOUSING -0.0872 0.0959 0.363
EDUCATION 0.3452 *** 0.0680 0.000
AGE 0.0060 * 0.0033 0.069
CONSTRUCT -0.0980 0.0843 0.245
TRANSPORT 0.3750 * 0.2061 0.069
WHOLESALE 0.0540 0.0959 0.574
RETAIL 0.1164 0.1299 0.370
REALESTATE -0.3353 * 0.1964 0.088
SERVICE -0.0010 0.1254 0.993
OTHER 0.2115 * 0.1235 0.087
HOKKAIDO -1.0413 *** 0.3659 0.004
TOHOKU -0.4336 0.2815 0.124
KITAKANTO 0.5002 * 0.2948 0.090
CHUBU -0.1333 0.2694 0.621
KANSAI 0.6717 *** 0.1516 0.000
CHUGOKU -0.0466 0.2835 0.870
SHIKOKU 0.4227 0.2757 0.125
KYUSYU -0.0393 0.2938 0.894
Number of observation 1863
F-value 42.8100
Prob (F value) 0.0000
R-squared 0.4513
Table 3.  Bank choice
(Dependent variable = log(BTASSET))












Market structureCoefficient Robust P-value Coefficient Robust P-value
Intercept Intercept -5.6140 4.6762 0.230 2.7754 25.3636 0.913
AUDIT 0.0199 0.5604 0.972 0.0780 0.5801 0.893
log(BTASSET) -0.1867 0.2120 0.379 -0.8089 1.8441 0.661
Market structure BRANCH -0.0010 0.0008 0.174 -0.0005 0.0017 0.773
log(ASSET) 0.9750 *** 0.2344 0.000 1.0569 *** 0.3253 0.001
CURRENT -0.0977 *** 0.0182 0.000 -0.0982 *** 0.0185 0.000
CAPRATIO 2.8799 *** 0.8157 0.000 3.0999 *** 1.0640 0.004
PPMARGIN -8.0105 *** 2.6824 0.003 -7.9330 *** 2.7932 0.005
BUILDING 0.1189 2.3963 0.960 -0.0143 2.4232 0.995
MACHINERY -1.9411 2.4693 0.432 -2.3659 2.6990 0.381
VEHICLE -1.4188 8.0359 0.860 -2.4269 8.4516 0.774
TOOL -5.2261 13.7440 0.704 -6.1197 13.5276 0.651
LAND 1.2202 2.1090 0.563 0.7806 2.4260 0.748
FAGE 0.5762 *** 0.0604 0.000 0.5767 *** 0.0594 0.000
FAGE2 -0.0017 *** 0.0005 0.000 -0.0017 *** 0.0005 0.000
EMPLOYEE 0.0050 * 0.0026 0.052 0.0052 * 0.0027 0.051
LISTED 3.2659 2.6847 0.224 3.5841 2.9124 0.218
OWNER -0.7182 0.5791 0.215 -0.8597 0.7127 0.228
GENDER 1.3820 1.7493 0.430 1.5392 1.8170 0.397
HOUSING 1.4786 0.9138 0.106 1.4187 0.9329 0.128
EDUCATION 0.6644 0.6093 0.276 0.8764 0.9021 0.331
AGE 0.1242 *** 0.0307 0.000 0.1280 *** 0.0325 0.000
CONSTRUCT -1.1519 0.7445 0.122 -1.2095 0.7723 0.117
TRANSPORT -0.8839 1.8032 0.624 -0.6385 1.9140 0.739
WHOLESALE 0.7777 0.9029 0.389 0.8098 0.8944 0.365
RETAIL -0.5468 1.3592 0.688 -0.4513 1.3517 0.738
REALESTATE -1.3791 1.4359 0.337 -1.5978 1.5821 0.313
SERVICE -1.7058 * 1.0226 0.095 -1.7060 * 1.0167 0.093
OTHER -0.6322 1.0678 0.554 -0.4990 1.1050 0.652
HOKKAIDO -0.9252 1.3872 0.505 -1.7847 2.9673 0.548
TOHOKU 2.6092 * 1.4221 0.067 1.9733 2.4519 0.421
KITAKANTO 3.1204 * 1.6659 0.061 3.1978 ** 1.6296 0.050
CHUBU 2.3249 * 1.2387 0.061 2.0412 1.5779 0.196
KANSAI 1.0493 1.1802 0.374 1.3613 1.4431 0.345
CHUGOKU 2.3465 1.5218 0.123 2.0253 1.8683 0.278
SHIKOKU 2.8812 * 1.6686 0.084 2.7552 1.7349 0.112
KYUSYU 2.2801 1.5360 0.138 1.8290 2.1047 0.385




Note: ***, **, or * means that the coefficient is statistically significant at 1%, 5%, or 10% level. P value for the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test is that of the coefficient of the first stage residual.




Durbin-Wu-Hausman test P value
(0.95918)
Table 4.  Determinants of relationship closeness









variablesCoefficient Robust P-value Coefficient Robust P-value
Intercept Intercept -0.3745 0.4717 0.427 4.8461 * 2.8642 0.091
AUDIT 0.0708 0.0566 0.211 0.1070 * 0.0633 0.091
log(BTASSET) -0.0715 *** 0.0215 0.001 -0.4587 ** 0.2107 0.029
Market structure BRANCH 0.0000 0.0001 0.588 0.0003 0.0002 0.123
log(ASSET) 0.1579 *** 0.0240 0.000 0.2089 *** 0.0396 0.000
CURRENT -0.0033 0.0054 0.539 -0.0037 0.0058 0.528
CAPRATIO -0.0762 0.1755 0.664 0.0607 0.1611 0.706
PPMARGIN 0.5125 * 0.2846 0.072 0.5607 0.3563 0.116
BUILDING -0.6354 ** 0.2727 0.020 -0.7183 ** 0.2923 0.014
MACHINERY 0.5042 0.3332 0.130 0.2399 0.3857 0.534
VEHICLE -0.0008 1.0153 0.999 -0.6280 1.0390 0.546
TOOL -1.7383 1.0732 0.105 -2.2943 ** 1.1466 0.045
LAND 0.5684 ** 0.2432 0.020 0.2949 0.2944 0.317
FAGE 0.0208 *** 0.0028 0.000 0.0211 *** 0.0027 0.000
FAGE2 -0.0001 *** 0.0000 0.000 -0.0001 *** 0.0000 0.000
EMPLOYEE 0.0003 ** 0.0001 0.026 0.0004 ** 0.0002 0.019
LISTED -0.5865 *** 0.2093 0.005 -0.3885 0.2443 0.112
OWNER 0.0900 0.0583 0.123 0.0020 0.0777 0.980
GENDER -0.0684 0.2022 0.735 0.0294 0.2201 0.894
HOUSING 0.0216 0.0848 0.799 -0.0157 0.0961 0.871
EDUCATION -0.1192 * 0.0633 0.060 0.0128 0.0986 0.897
AGE -0.0042 0.0030 0.163 -0.0019 0.0035 0.587
CONSTRUCT -0.0804 0.0773 0.299 -0.1162 0.0864 0.179
TRANSPORT -0.5685 ** 0.2489 0.022 -0.4158 0.2849 0.144
WHOLESALE -0.0424 0.0823 0.607 -0.0224 0.0870 0.797
RETAIL -0.3471 *** 0.1082 0.001 -0.2877 ** 0.1208 0.017
REALESTATE -0.7989 *** 0.1850 0.000 -0.9350 *** 0.2064 0.000
SERVICE -0.5978 *** 0.1393 0.000 -0.5979 *** 0.1426 0.000
OTHER -0.5347 *** 0.1493 0.000 -0.4518 *** 0.1597 0.005
HOKKAIDO 0.1337 0.1432 0.351 -0.4013 0.3347 0.231
TOHOKU -0.0295 0.1479 0.842 -0.4252 0.2716 0.117
KITAKANTO -0.1772 0.2013 0.379 -0.1290 0.2059 0.531
CHUBU 0.1290 0.1177 0.273 -0.0476 0.1657 0.774
KANSAI 0.0918 0.1052 0.383 0.2860 * 0.1532 0.062
CHUGOKU 0.0644 0.1479 0.663 -0.1355 0.1974 0.493
SHIKOKU 0.0635 0.1581 0.688 -0.0149 0.1739 0.932
KYUSYU 0.0936 0.1565 0.550 -0.1871 0.2338 0.423




Note: ***, **, or * means that the coefficient is statistically significant at 1%, 5%, or 10% level. P value for the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test is that of the coefficient of the first stage residual.
Industry dummies
Regional dummies
Hansen's J test statistic (P value)
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test P value
(0.02883)
OLS
Table 5.  Determinants of relationship closeness









variablesCoefficient Robust P-value Coefficient Robust P-value
Intercept Intercept 1.2122 4.0077 0.762 -1.1111 26.0017 0.966
AUDIT 0.4561 0.4207 0.278 0.4393 0.4882 0.368
log(BTASSET) 0.6840 *** 0.2149 0.001 0.8567 1.8588 0.645
Market structure BRANCH -0.0021 *** 0.0007 0.004 -0.0023 0.0016 0.147
log(ASSET) 0.3682 0.2289 0.108 0.3454 0.2820 0.221
CURRENT 0.1074 *** 0.0151 0.000 0.1075 *** 0.0147 0.000
CAPRATIO -0.7546 0.7202 0.295 -0.8157 0.9948 0.412
PPMARGIN -2.8857 3.2912 0.381 -2.9066 3.3030 0.379
BUILDING 4.7390 * 2.8409 0.095 4.7774 * 2.8505 0.094
MACHINERY -0.5398 2.0651 0.794 -0.4175 2.3720 0.860
VEHICLE -0.7834 4.8910 0.873 -0.5058 5.9398 0.932
TOOL 50.2665 *** 19.1553 0.009 50.5518 ** 19.9403 0.011
LAND 1.0389 1.5428 0.501 1.1563 2.0002 0.563
FAGE -0.0262 * 0.0157 0.094 -0.0264 * 0.0153 0.084
FAGE2 0.0000 0.0001 0.680 0.0000 0.0001 0.718
EMPLOYEE 0.0002 0.0012 0.859 0.0002 0.0014 0.912
LISTED 4.1554 3.0909 0.179 4.0720 3.0136 0.177
OWNER -0.6829 * 0.3971 0.086 -0.6405 0.6495 0.324
GENDER -0.8929 1.2759 0.484 -0.9494 1.4335 0.508
HOUSING 0.5785 0.6923 0.403 0.5952 0.7625 0.435
EDUCATION 0.5726 0.4211 0.174 0.5134 0.8120 0.527
AGE -0.0602 *** 0.0204 0.003 -0.0613 ** 0.0249 0.014
CONSTRUCT -2.4526 *** 0.5502 0.000 -2.4374 *** 0.6074 0.000
TRANSPORT -2.2203 * 1.1915 0.063 -2.2861 * 1.3003 0.079
WHOLESALE -3.0570 *** 0.5402 0.000 -3.0637 *** 0.5230 0.000
RETAIL -4.4501 *** 0.7809 0.000 -4.4774 *** 0.7823 0.000
REALESTATE -1.7299 1.9028 0.363 -1.6699 2.0598 0.418
SERVICE -3.0827 *** 0.7512 0.000 -3.0859 *** 0.7390 0.000
OTHER -2.5979 ** 1.2221 0.034 -2.6326 ** 1.2052 0.029
HOKKAIDO -0.8019 1.0456 0.443 -0.5564 2.9805 0.852
TOHOKU -2.1698 1.3459 0.107 -1.9879 2.5859 0.442
KITAKANTO 0.1199 2.3284 0.959 0.1019 2.3020 0.965
CHUBU -1.4722 1.2545 0.241 -1.3863 1.6911 0.412
KANSAI -1.0205 1.0782 0.344 -1.0973 1.2654 0.386
CHUGOKU 0.0458 1.5668 0.977 0.1416 2.0029 0.944
SHIKOKU -1.6182 1.7601 0.358 -1.5769 1.8928 0.405
KYUSYU -1.8107 1.3658 0.185 -1.6780 2.1473 0.435





Table 6.  Determinants of relationship closeness










Note: ***, **, or * means that the coefficient is statistically significant at 1%, 5%, or 10% level. P value for the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test is that of the coefficient of the first stage residual.
Hansen's J test statistic (P value)
Industry dummies
Regional dummies
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test P value
(0.53757)Coefficient Robust P-value Coefficient Robust P-value
Intercept Intercept 101.2450 *** 31.2730 0.001 55.1605 169.3204 0.745
AUDIT 3.4950 3.9531 0.377 3.1955 4.0042 0.425
log(BTASSET) -8.0881 *** 1.5157 0.000 -4.6568 12.3465 0.706
Market structure BRANCH 0.0084 * 0.0046 0.066 0.0055 0.0113 0.627
log(ASSET) 6.2805 *** 1.5770 0.000 5.8277 ** 2.3528 0.013
CURRENT -0.0658 0.1504 0.662 -0.0637 0.1515 0.674
CAPRATIO -9.8301 6.3965 0.125 -10.9884 7.7113 0.154
PPMARGIN 50.4672 * 26.3383 0.056 50.1115 ** 25.6191 0.050
BUILDING -13.4065 14.3122 0.349 -12.7660 14.4279 0.376
MACHINERY -21.6190 18.3335 0.238 -19.3000 19.7803 0.329
VEHICLE 47.5427 46.2228 0.304 53.2851 51.6870 0.303
TOOL 99.9686 112.1123 0.373 105.5325 112.8596 0.350
LAND -2.2487 15.1290 0.882 0.1172 16.4911 0.994
FAGE 0.3721 *** 0.1370 0.007 0.3684 *** 0.1353 0.006
FAGE2 -0.0012 ** 0.0006 0.033 -0.0012 ** 0.0006 0.032
EMPLOYEE 0.0172 0.0114 0.132 0.0161 0.0116 0.166
LISTED 21.3597 17.7275 0.228 19.6061 18.8559 0.298
OWNER 8.5670 ** 4.2916 0.046 9.4011 * 5.6757 0.098
GENDER 16.4178 11.1425 0.141 15.2585 11.8324 0.197
HOUSING 6.3065 5.9344 0.288 6.5941 5.9430 0.267
EDUCATION -6.8592 4.3801 0.118 -8.0034 5.5715 0.151
AGE -0.3263 0.2124 0.125 -0.3461 0.2134 0.105
CONSTRUCT -10.0033 * 5.5466 0.071 -9.7248 * 5.6603 0.086
TRANSPORT -14.4045 11.7475 0.220 -15.7326 12.4527 0.206
WHOLESALE 0.5879 6.8589 0.932 0.4294 6.8181 0.950
RETAIL -9.7874 9.0388 0.279 -10.3492 9.1694 0.259
REALESTATE -4.6120 13.3060 0.729 -3.4173 13.7317 0.803
SERVICE -17.7236 *** 6.2115 0.004 -17.8836 *** 6.0859 0.003
OTHER -17.3111 ** 7.3062 0.018 -18.0192 ** 7.6467 0.018
HOKKAIDO 3.0288 8.2892 0.715 7.8654 19.4408 0.686
TOHOKU 5.2207 8.4897 0.539 8.8295 15.2957 0.564
KITAKANTO -0.6916 10.0375 0.945 -1.0510 9.9919 0.916
CHUBU 10.0815 6.9480 0.147 11.7247 9.5868 0.221
KANSAI 1.5790 6.2673 0.801 -0.0341 7.8027 0.997
CHUGOKU 32.0424 *** 11.4755 0.005 33.8975 ** 13.5414 0.012
SHIKOKU 30.7395 ** 12.9926 0.018 31.5005 ** 13.2709 0.018
KYUSYU 8.7448 9.4954 0.357 11.3320 14.0741 0.421




Note: ***, **, or * means that the coefficient is statistically significant at 1%, 5%, or 10% level. P value for the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test is that of the coefficient of the first stage residual.
Industry dummies
Regional dummies
Hansen's J test statistic (P value)
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test P value
(0.25207)
OLS
Table 7.  Determinants of relationship closeness









variablesCoefficient Robust P-value Coefficient Robust P-value
Intercept Intercept -2.2091 * 1.3186 0.094 -3.1603 6.0354 0.601
AUDIT -0.0228 0.1798 0.899 -0.0293 0.1690 0.862
log(BTASSET) 0.1852 *** 0.0641 0.004 0.2558 0.4725 0.588
Market structure BRANCH 0.0001 0.0002 0.782 0.0000 0.0005 0.996
log(ASSET) 0.2296 *** 0.0705 0.001 0.2203 ** 0.0927 0.017
CURRENT -0.0039 0.0041 0.340 -0.0038 0.0040 0.335
CAPRATIO -1.1734 *** 0.3400 0.001 -1.1983 *** 0.3716 0.001
PPMARGIN -0.1791 1.1457 0.876 -0.1879 1.1556 0.871
BUILDING -0.4686 0.7130 0.511 -0.4535 0.7178 0.527
MACHINERY 1.0620 0.7302 0.146 1.1102 0.7869 0.158
VEHICLE -3.3090 ** 1.4608 0.024 -3.1947 ** 1.5911 0.045
TOOL 5.8695 7.4711 0.432 5.9708 7.6834 0.437
LAND 1.0279 0.8887 0.248 1.0778 0.8427 0.201
FAGE -0.0094 * 0.0055 0.088 -0.0094 * 0.0054 0.082
FAGE2 0.0000 ** 0.0000 0.014 0.0000 ** 0.0000 0.015
EMPLOYEE 0.0073 *** 0.0021 0.000 0.0073 *** 0.0021 0.000
LISTED 0.6755 0.5774 0.242 0.6394 0.6358 0.315
OWNER -0.3521 0.2185 0.107 -0.3361 0.2508 0.180
GENDER -0.0450 0.3744 0.904 -0.0628 0.3827 0.870
HOUSING 0.3100 0.2540 0.222 0.3168 0.2325 0.173
EDUCATION -0.1044 0.1769 0.555 -0.1284 0.2495 0.607
AGE 0.0086 0.0079 0.279 0.0082 0.0089 0.362
CONSTRUCT 0.1404 0.1602 0.381 0.1470 0.1724 0.394
TRANSPORT -1.0422 ** 0.5010 0.038 -1.0700 ** 0.4942 0.030
WHOLESALE 0.6226 ** 0.2436 0.011 0.6189 *** 0.2321 0.008
RETAIL 1.4271 0.8921 0.110 1.4162 0.9043 0.117
REALESTATE 1.7346 *** 0.4460 0.000 1.7594 *** 0.4739 0.000
SERVICE 0.2291 0.2636 0.385 0.2291 0.2626 0.383
OTHER 0.9710 ** 0.3894 0.013 0.9559 ** 0.3871 0.014
HOKKAIDO 0.1149 0.8121 0.887 0.2124 0.8132 0.794
TOHOKU -0.3911 0.4062 0.336 -0.3190 0.4285 0.457
KITAKANTO -0.7983 * 0.4734 0.092 -0.8071 0.4977 0.105
CHUBU -0.5786 * 0.3455 0.094 -0.5464 * 0.2886 0.058
KANSAI 0.0082 0.3207 0.980 -0.0272 0.4671 0.954
CHUGOKU 0.0100 0.4157 0.981 0.0464 0.3600 0.897
SHIKOKU 0.2377 0.5031 0.637 0.2519 0.4651 0.588
KYUSYU 0.1066 0.4464 0.811 0.1577 0.4251 0.711




Note: ***, **, or * means that the coefficient is statistically significant at 1%, 5%, or 10% level. P value for the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test is that of the coefficient of the first stage residual.
Industry dummies
Regional dummies
Hansen's J test statistic (P value)
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test P value
(0.47535)
OLS
Table 8.  Determinants of relationship closeness
(Dependent variable = NOBK)
IV
Entrepreneur's
characteristics
Firm's financial
numbers
Firm's
characteristics
Main independent
variables